Fudulu Paul. 2007. Teoria Economica a culturilor si institutiilor, Editura Universitara, Bucharest.
This book was written in Romanian as a support to my course on Economic Theory of Institutions. Currently I am working on its English translation (editing and proofreading are performed by Colleen Spears, US). It makes up a comprehensive perspective on institutions because in separate chapters it deals with fundamental topics of the filed: the assumed type of personality, rules, institutions, cultural preferences, institutional choice, and enforcement mechanism, the relationship among economic performance, institutions and cultures. It is a completely different perspective from the orthodox new institutional economics or any other perspective on institutions: unlike the previous prevalent institutional theories, it is a trans-cultural perspective. For the first time, according to my knowledge, it is acknowledged the existence of a rational institutional choice as a particular form of individual choice and it is suggested the existence of a rule for institutional choice. The orthodox new institutional economics deals only with institutional change because the Western culture blindness leaves no alternative to the ideal Western institutional setting. In the last but not in the least, it contains a special chapter on how culture blindness or the inability of Western scholars to accept coercive transactions worked out a completely false theory of externalities and public goods.
Fudulu Paul. 2002. Fundamental Ideas in Economic Theory of Institutions, Romanian Centre for Consent and Compared Economics, Bucharest.
This book puts together what I consider some more relevant studies I wrote and published since 1995. They are all about fundamental concepts and it was my interest in clarifying these concepts that led me to the crucial role of cultures and institutions in economic development. My own research experience proved that fundamental economic problems such as the cause of economic success or failure cannot be solved without first defining in proper way fundamental concepts like the real maximand, coercion, justice, public goods, culture, rule and institution. It is not at all the case that these concepts can wait, for different reasons, to be defined while economists can go ahead to solve their specific problems. On the contrary, one cannot solve any of the fundamental economic problems without first solving the definition of these fundamental concepts.
Fudulu, Paul. 2000. Handicapped Societies. A Theory of Continuous Economic Failure, The Romanian Centre for Compared and Consensual Economics, Bucharest.
In my first book, Metamaximzation, individual’s maximization of relative positions on equal footing with wealth was based on my own culture experience. In this second book, I lay the conceptual ground for a new paradigm: maximand is shifted from an invariable orthodox absolute wealth to a general power maximand, which has two components: wealth and power. Proofs are found that great social scholars thought the same way. This is true even for the classical economists Smith and Mill who limited the assumed maximand only to absolute wealth based on predictive and normative reasons. Because the maximand components are components of individual’s external (natural and human) environment, I suggest the following rationale for cultural determination of economic performance: natural environment shaped through the length of human power scale the opportunity cots of all-inclusive objectives wealth and power; further on, they consistently shaped individuals’ preferences for wealth and power. The preference for wealth is variable and a derived result. Specific natural external environments of different collectivities shaped their specific cultural preferences for the objective of wealth. A high preference for wealth naturally entails a high economic performance. It is this causal chain that explains the better “performance” (if we can speak of performance at all) in terms of wealth of those collectivities that originally lived in cold climates. It is again this causal chain that explains why it is so difficult to change the economic performance of collectivities: culture is hard to change if at all. Consequently, a collectivity that originally shaped low preferences for wealth can be modeled as truly handicapped in terms of good economic performance, at least for the predictable future. The relatively recent good economic performance of collectivities that shaped originally low cultural preferences for wealth is due to the direct and indirect pressure exercised by the economically successful collectivities with high cultural preferences for wealth; they make up no exception from suggested rationale. This model makes up a strong defense for the unidirectional movement of cultures and the unavoidable decline of cultures with low preference for wealth.
Fudulu, Paul. 1995. Metamaximizare. Avutie si justitie, Expert Publishing House, Bucharest.
This book is based on an almost two-year research period at the Center for Study of Public Choice, GMU, Virginia. It started as a reaction to Professor Buchanan’s shocking acceptance during one of his seminar (right at the beginning of my first visit of one and half years at the Center) of his inability to define fundamental terms as voluntary and coercive transactions. I started by rejecting Commons, Hale and Hayek’s definitions and found an economic definition consistent with great philosophers’ definition of liberty and, implicitly, coercion. A Pareto-related geometrical description is then introduced. Further on, within a meta-maximization individual process, orthodox absolute positions are combined on equal footing with relative positions, something which is not conceivable from a Western perspective but is strongly suggested by Eastern cultures. Real behavior that seems irrational from an orthodox perspective, like waging a war or individuals’ concern with justice – something that irritated Hayek – becomes very rational and easy to depict employing metautility curves. Hayek, Nozick and Rawls’ conception of justice are thoroughly analyzed from a meta-maximization perspective. Ideas from this book were co-authored in a short paper with Roger Congleton and published in JEBO.